The general restrictions on all economic primitives (i.e., (a) endowments, (b) preferences, and (c) asset return distributions) that yield the CAPM under the expected utility paradigm are provided. These results are then used to derive the class of restrictions on preferences and the distribution of asset returns alone that provides the CAPM. We also show that the conditions that provide the CAPM and derived preferences over mean and variance are equivalent. Consequently, this paper also resolves the question of when mean variance maximization is consistent with expected utility maximization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G12, G11, D50.
INTRODUCTION
The single-period Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was originally derived under the assumption that investors have utility functions over only the mean and variance of their end of period consumption [23, 14, 17] . At the time, the only conditions that were known to generate these preferences under the expected utility paradigm were investors with quadratic utility functions or assets with normally distributed returns. Since then, Ross [21] showed that the CAPM can be derived from any two-fund separating distribution and that the normal distribution is a special case of these distributions. However, the complete set of conditions under the expected utility paradigm that are necessary and sufficient for the CAPM article no. ET962218
are not known. In this paper we completely characterize the set of all economic primitives, that is, endowments, preferences, and asset return distributions, that yield the CAPM in equilibrium under the expected utility paradigm.
Both Allingham [1] and Nielsen [18] provide sufficient conditions for existence of CAPM equilibria. However, these conditions are difficult to interpret within the expected utility paradigm because both authors assume that all agents have preferences over mean and variance alone. We show that if, for any wealth level, agents are assumed to be risk averse and always prefer more to less then, under the expected utility paradigm, these conditions are no more general than Ross' conditions.
A related literature, which has as its goal the answer to the question of when expected utility maximization is consistent with mean variance maximization, has its foundation in Tobin's [24] original conjecture that any two-parameter distribution will provide indirect preferences over mean and variance and Feldstein's [10] lognormal counter-example. It has since grown into a research topic unto itself, separate from the literature on the CAPM. 1 We show that the restrictions on primitives that provide the CAPM in equilibrium are equivalent to the conditions that provide indirect utility functions over mean and variance alone in equilibrium. Consequently, this paper also provides the conditions under which expected utility maximization and mean variance analysis are consistent.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model and Section 3 derives the main result the necessary and sufficient conditions that provide the CAPM. All non-trivial proofs are collected in the Appendix.
THE MODEL
Traditionally the CAPM has been derived in a one-period, single consumption good, exchange economy. Each agent } # K has a von Neuman Morgernstern utility function, E[U } (x } )], over final consumption x } # X } , where X } /L 2 , the vector space of real-valued random variables whose variances exist. U } : R Ä R is assumed to be continuous, concave, and differentiable with
It is traditional to assume, in addition, that U } is strictly increasing everywhere. However, in the CAPM literature this assumption is not imposed (e.g., quadratic utility functions). Therefore, at this point we will make no further assumptions on U } .
At the beginning of the period, agents trade in I< securities that pay off at the end of the period in the consumption good. Each security, i # I, is uniquely defined by its return R i # R, where the returns set R/L 2 . The riskless asset is always assumed to be an element of I and is labeled 0. 3 For convenience we will define r#R 0 .
A portfolio is a vector : # R I with I i=0 : i =1. The return of a portfolio, :, is just the sum of the return of its constituent securities, R : = I i=0 : i R i . Initially, each agent has wealth W } which is invested in the endowment portfolio e } . Since each agent's endowment is a portfolio, the total endowment is also a portfolio. This portfolio, :
) and is known as the market portfolio. We assume that the value of the total endowment is nonzero 4 and adopt the price normalization } # K W } =1, that is, the total endowment's price is 1. Any portfolio : is said to be a levered position in the market portfolio if there exists an a # R such that, :=a: m +(1&a) e 0 , where e 0 is an I-vector with its first component equal to 1 and the rest 0. A portfolio : is said to be mean variance efficient in a return set R if it has the minimum variance of all portfolios that have its expected return.
We are now ready to define the equilibrium in this economy. The portfolio, :
The set of all consumption portfolios, [: } ] } # K , is said to be marketclearing if
A set of consumption portfolios and a return set ([:
} is strictly supported by the return set R and markets clear. Agent }'s consumption portfolio x } , is defined to be admissible if the following two properties are satisfied: (i) U$ } (x } )>0 (i.e., marginal utility 247 NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE CAPM is strictly positive in every state), and (ii) x } is an interior point in X } . 5 If an agent's consumption, x } , is admissible, then the portfolio, :
} , that generates this consumption is also admissible. 
, if, and only if, (i) the equilibrium is admissible, (ii) the market portfolio, : m , is mean variance efficient for R, and (iii) every agent }'s consumption portfolio, :
} , is a levered position in the market portfolio.
Although this definition of a CAPM equilibrium is consistent with other definitions in the literature, past researchers have not defined the equilibrium in precisely this way. For instance, [18, 19, 1] provide existence conditions for CAPM equilibria by deriving conditions for the existence of general equilibria when agents have preferences over mean and variance alone. They therefore implicitly define the model to be any equilibrium that results in an economy in which agents have preferences over mean and variance alone. Since the object of the paper is to derive the set of conditions on primitives that provide the CAPM, we cannot define the model in terms of restrictions on primitives.
We define the CAPM in terms of the distinct characteristics of the equilibrium in which agents have preferences over mean and variance: (i) each asset's expected return is a linear function of the expected return of the market portfolio, and (ii) every agent's portfolio consists of a combination of only the market portfolio and the riskless asset. Admissibility is added because it is traditional in the CAPM literature to make two additional assumptions. First, it is well known that restricting agents to preferences that are increasing in mean and decreasing in variance alone, does not necessarily imply that all agents prefer more to less. Consequently, the traditional literature on the CAPM does not assume that agents' utility functions are strictly increasing everywhere. However, most derivations of the CAPM implicitly assume that, in equilibrium, agents prefer more to less (see, for example, [11, p. 96] ). Second, since the CAPM pricing result relies on every agent's ability to make marginal trade-offs in equilibrium, no agent can be constrained because she is on the boundary of her choice set.
THE RESTRICTIONS THAT SUPPORT THE CAPM
Before the complete set of primitives that provide the CAPM can be derived, a parsimonious characterization of the asset span is needed.
with
and, in addition, for i # I
$ j is referred to as the j th factor and = i as the residual of the i th security. The reason that (3) (9) can always be satisfied is that no restriction is placed on J, the number of factors. By setting the number of factors equal to the number of risky securities (which allows = i #0, \i # I), (3) (9) are trivially satisfied. We will henceforth refer to any (3) (9) as a factor structure. Any factor structure in which the number of factors, J, is the minimum number of factors required to satisfy (3) (9) will be referred to as a minimal factor structure. Now, for a minimal factor structure
2 , define the class of functions of y that are orthogonal to the factors:
This class of functions is clearly non-empty. 6 Furthermore, for any given consumption y, the set 1 2 [ y] is determined by the span of the factors. In general, since even a minimal factor structure is not uniquely determined, the set 1 2 [ y] depends on the choice of factor structure. However, an exception occurs when y is generated by a portfolio that is a levered position in the market portfolio: The proof of this lemma is straighforward and is left to the reader. In view of this lemma we will henceforth drop the 2 subscript on the set 1 2 [ y] whenever y is generated by a portfolio that is a levered position in the market.
Given a risk free rate r, define 5(r) to be the set of all market-clearing consumption allocations in which every agent }'s consumption, x } , is a levered position in the market portfolio and is admissible, i.e.,
The following proposition and its corollaries are the main contributions of the paper: 
where
Furthermore, the value of \ that solves the above equations is r, the risk free rate in the economy.
Corollary 3.1. Assume that R m has a continuous, strictly increasing, distribution function with support (D, U ) R. Then Eq. (11) in the above proposition can be replaced with (12) . K Remark. This proposition provides the conditions in terms of what is traditionally taken, in the CAPM literature, as one of the primitives of the economy, namely, the set of asset returns. In most general equilibrium models the asset return set would not be regarded as a primitive since it requires knowledge of equilibrium prices to compute it. Note, however, that asset returns enter in only three places: R m , 1[ } ], and W } . Under the price normalization (i.e., the total endowment has price 1) R m is not a function of prices. Since the factors are also not a function of prices (they are a function of the asset span which does not depend on prices), 1[C } R m +(W } &C } ) \] also does not depend on prices. Finally, W } can be defined without any knowledge of equilibrium prices by valuing each agent's asset endowment in the return set for which the market portfolio is mean variance efficient. Consequently, no knowledge of equilibrium prices is required to check the conditions in the proposition.
It follows immediately from Proposition 3.1 that indirect preferences over mean and variance alone are not only sufficient, but also necessary for the CAPM. To see why, note that (11) implies that in a CAPM equilibrium, the non-linear part of each agent's marginal utility function prices the assets at zero. Consequently, the non-linear part of every agent's marginal utility function can be deleted without affecting the equilibrium. That is, all agents' utility functions can be replaced with quadratic functions, so the conditions that provide the CAPM and mean variance maximization are identical in this economy. The proposition therefore answers the question of when expected utility maximization is consistent with mean variance maximization.
It has long been recognized (see [9] ) that the presence of financial (i.e., zero net supply) assets with non-linear payoffs such as options pose a challenge to the CAPM since the distribution of these assets returns are clearly not normal (or more generally two-fund separating). The question then arises: Under what conditions can a zero net supply asset with an arbitrary return distribution be added to an economy without upsetting an existing CAPM equilibrium? Proposition 3.1 provides the answer to the question. Since the asset span only enters through 1, the conditions in the proposition remain unchanged whenever the part of the return of the new asset not spanned by the factors is a residual; i.e., if the return of the new asset is denoted R i , then the CAPM will continue to hold so long as
When the CAPM holds, both the market and agents' marginal utility functions price assets. Consequently, their projections onto the factors must be the same. The following corollary proves this:
In an equilibrium of the economy, the CAPM holds if, and only if,
where the jth element of ; b m 2 , ..., b mJ ) is the market portfolio's sensitivity to the factors (the market betas).
From Proposition 3.1 and its corollaries it is apparent why the CAPM holds under the two well-known conditions. Equation (12) implies that the CAPM can only hold if all agents' utility functions differ from a quadratic function by a term whose derivative is orthogonal to every factor in the economy. The quadratic function itself trivially satisfies this condition. Similarly, when J=1, ; } and b m are scalars and so (13) does not restrict ; } . Thus, any two-fund separating distribution (where one factor is the riskless asset) satisfies the corollary.
Finally, we sketch 7 how the results in this paper can be used to answer a question posed by Ross [22, p. 889] : What joint restrictions on preferences and distributions provide the CAPM? This question was motivated by the observation that quadratic utility and two-fund separating distributions, by themselves, are necessary and sufficient for the CAPM. That is, Ross [21] showed that in the absence of any further assumptions on primitives, the CAPM can only hold under the two-fund separating distributional assumption, and it follows immediately from [5] that in the absence of any further assumptions on primitives, the CAPM can only hold under the quadratic preference assumption. Since assumptions on endowments are ruled out on economic grounds, the only potential set of undiscovered conditions were joint restrictions on preferences and distributions.
Equation (13) implies, for any two factors k and
. Assume all agents have polynomial utility functions of order N. This equation then becomes,
where % } and ; } are defined implicitly. By expanding each term on the lefthand side of the above series, it becomes clear that the only way it will be zero for any endowment allocation (i.e., for every b mj ) and any two factors k and l is if for every positive integer m N and every non-negative integer 
These restrictions (i.e., polynomial utility functions of order N and (15)) therefore define a class of joint restrictions on preferences and distributions that provide the CAPM. Since the only analytic functions with finite power series expansions are the polynomials, every other analytic function must have an infinite power series expansion. It therefore immediately follows that the only way the CAPM can hold when utility functions are assumed to be analytic but not polynomial, is if either J=1 or (15) holds with N= . As was pointed out above, the case for N= (i.e., any analytic function) was solved by Ross [21] . Thus no other joint restrictions on preferences and distributions exist that provide the CAPM. Intuitively, if agents' utility functions are polynomials of order N or less, agents will not care about any moment above the N th. Therefore, to get the CAPM to hold, all central moments from the third to the Nth need to be restricted so that agents are indifferent to them. The above moment restrictions on the distribution of the factors (i.e., (15) ) effects this. The case when J=1 corresponds to Ross' two-fund separating distributions. When J{1, and the utility functions are not polynomials, then the CAPM can only hold if all factor moments satisfy (15) . An example of such an economy is asset returns that are elliptically distributed. 8 As the reader can verify, every moment of the elliptical distributions satisfies (15) . These joint restrictions therefore provide an intuitive link between quadratic utilities on the one hand, and elliptical distributions on the other hand. To get the CAPM, the power series coefficients of agents' utility functions and the central moments of the factor distributions must be restricted. Quadratic utility and elliptical distributions represent the extreme position of using only one of these strategies at a time.
Unfortunately, the complete set of restrictions that provide the CAPM are no more realistic than the previously known set. Even if consumption is restricted to be positive, no finite order polynomial is both strictly increasing and strictly concave in the positive domain. When the class of utility functions is expanded to include any analytic function that is everywhere strictly concave and strictly increasing, Ross [21] has shown that the CAPM will only hold if return distributions are two-fund separating. Ross' conditions therefore provide the only realistic way, within the expected utility paradigm, to get the CAPM (or mean variance preferences).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Dybvig and Ingersoll [9] have shown that : m is mean variance efficient if and only if
For any } # K in an admissible equilibrium ([11, p. 66]),
Therefore, when the market portfolio is mean variance efficient in equilibrium then both (16) and (17) hold so:
Using (3), (6), (9) , and that J is the minimum number of factors, it can be shown that the only way (18) can be satisfied 9 is if
The above derivation shows that the CAPM holds in an equilibrium if and only if (19) holds for every } when x # 5(r). We next show that when x # 5(r), (11) implies (19) and so the above argument allows us to conclude that the CAPM holds. Setting \=r in (11) provides:
Taking expectations (for every }),
Using (20) and (21) it is straightforward to verify that (19) is satisfied so the CAPM holds. Last, we need to show that if the CAPM holds in at least one equilibrium of the economy, then the conditions in the proposition will be satisfied. If the CAPM holds in equilibrium, then (19) holds for every } when x # 5(r). This implies that
Taking expectations of both sides of (22) 
which is (11). K 
where,
:
Note that (27) follows from the fact that the projection of every agent's marginal utility function onto the factors is a constant multiple of the market projection onto the factors. Let 
